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In an article published April 26 in the WASHINGTON POST, staff writer John M. Goshko describes
the "Reaganites' raid" on the State Department's Latin America bureau, and some consequences
of the administration's disregard for area expertise. When Reagan entered office January 1981,
then Asst. Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, William G. Bowdler, knew he was one of
several career diplomats holding policymaking decisions in the previous administration who was
likely to replaced. Bowdler, with 30 years in the Foreign Service, had served under both Republican
and Democratic administrations as ambassador to El Salvador, Guatemala and South Africa, and
as State's director of intelligence and research. Traditional practice would have dictated that his
credentials entitled him to a major ambassadorial appointment. Within 24 hours of Reagan's
inauguration, Bowdler was removed entirely from the Foreign Service. In the next few months,
the Reaganites at State had removed virtually every career diplomat who had been involved in
planning and directing the Carter administration's Central America policies. In 1981, Robert E.
White, the ambassador in El Salvador, was fired; Lawrence A. Pezzullo, ambassador in Nicaragua,
was dispatched to a university as diplomat in residence and retired shortly afterward; George W.
Landau, who had been nominated for the ambassadorship in Guatemala, ended up in Venezuela
instead. Landau was prepared to take a "tough line toward the military dictatorship then in power."
Next, John A. Bushnell, who had been Bowdler's principal deputy, was declared off limits by the
White House for an ambassadorial appointment. After a year of waiting, he was sent to Argentina
as deputy chief of mission. James R. Cheek, Bowdler's Central America deputy, was appointed
deputy chief of mission in Katmandu, Nepal. When Alexander Haig took over as Secretary of
State, he was committed to defeating the left in Central America. Bowdler was replaced with
Thomas O. Enders, an experienced diplomat who had held numerous positions, but none related
to Central America. For instance, Enders had been deputy head of the US Embassy in Cambodia at
the height of Washington's involvement in Southeast Asia. Many of Ender's aides and associates
who worked with him on Central America had experience in Indochina during the Vietnam
war. Goshko writes that for the Foreign Service, Bowdler's dismissal was the beginning of one of
its most troubled period in three decades. The factors which led to this sorry situation include:
changes in the promotion system that many believe now discriminate unfairly against officers
with the greatest language and area expertise; reduction in chances for advancement caused by
Reagan's awarding of unprecedented numbers of ambassadorships to political appointees, most
of whom are poorly qualified by Foreign Service standards; austerity imposed by congressional
unwillingness to provide money for foreign policy purposes; and, the inability of the service, "a
formerly tradition-bound bastion of white male elitism, to better reflect contemporary American
society by providing opportunities for women and minorities. Many Foreign Service officers claim
the impact of the "Reagan revolution" on morale was severe. "Some privately compared it to the
early 1950s, when then-Sen. Joseph McCarthy treason of professional diplomats for the gains made
by communists in Eastern Europe and Asia." Enders was the first of three men to head the Inter©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.
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American Affairs bureau under the Reagan administration. He was removed when it became
apparent to the Reaganites that he was not convinced of the viability of a military solution to the
Nicaragua problem. The current assistant secretary, Elliott Abrams, is a political appointee and is
committed to supporting the contras. Last fall, Abrams fired John Ferch, a seasoned career diplomat,
as ambassador to Honduras because he was not sufficiently committed to supporting contra
operations. Since then, one of State's most respected Latin America specialists, Francis J. McNeill,
retired as deputy director of intelligence. McNeill charged that Abrams questioned his loyalty
because of his analyses of weaknesses in the contra program. In Central America diplomacy, the
Reagan administration has tended to rely not on area experts, but on individuals with reputations
"as good generalists willing to follow orders and not raise troubling questions." An "open secret" in
the State Department is that experienced Latin America experts privately disagree with the rationale
of administration policy in Central America. One of these diplomats told the POST, "By supporting
the contras, we are pursuing a policy that gives Nicaragua a credible excuse for presenting itself as
the aggrieved victim of American-supported military intervention, but that does not give the United
States a credible vehicle for getting rid of the Sandinistas." On concluding a duty tour in Central
America midway through the Reagan administration, another diplomat said, "It isn't embarrassing
that the secretary of state doesn't know anything about Central America. And it is only moderately
embarrassing that the assistant secretary doesn't know very much. But it is very bad when the
deputy assistant secretaries and even the office directors know so little." Although the Reaganites
have always denied they purged the Latin bureau in 1981, in private "senior officials admit that
their aim was to get rid of everyone who they felt could not be entrusted to implement what would
become the most controversial foreign policy of the Reagan presidency: Its effort to block what the
new administration perceived as a Soviet-Cuban effort to use Nicaragua as a base for spreading
communist subversion through the hemisphere." The treatment of Bowdler and associates at the
hands of the Reagan team sent shock waves through the Service. Other administrations, including
Carter's, had attempted to impose their own ideological views on foreign policy, and particularly
in regard to Latin America. "But the wholesale purging of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
carried out by the Reagan team caused many career diplomats to conclude that a new rule was being
written: That if they are too diligent in trying to carry out the policies of a specific administration,
their loyalty may be questioned when the shifting tides of American politics cast up a different
president with very different views." According to many career diplomats, ideological pressures
have receded since George Shultz became Secretary of State in 1982. Shultz reportedly restored
morale considerably by picking bright young members of the service as key aides, and standing up
for the Service in difficult moments. An example, writes Goshko, is that in the upheaval surrounding
security at the US Embassy in Moscow, Shultz has asserted that the responsibility is his and "has
sought to avert a new wave of Foreign Service bashing by Congress." While Secretary Shultz
has been perceived as good for Foreign Service morale overall, he has not reversed the Reagan
administration's preferences in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. For US career diplomats,
the 1980s started out with the trauma of seeing 52 colleagues from the US Embassy in Tehran held
hostage for 444 days while Washington stood by in "helpless anguish." With the on-going exposures
of the Iran-contra affair, the Service faces humiliation once again. Among other things, this affair
has revealed how State's role as principal instrument of US foreign policy was usurped by the staff
of the National Security Council, and specifically, by Lt. Col. Oliver North, a low-level staff member
with no background in Mideast affairs.
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